MARV was imported by tourists from Zimbabwe to South Africa in 1975 and from Uganda to the USA and the

Netherlands in 2008 [61]. EBOV was also imported into South Africa from Gabon by a medical practitioner in 1996 [62]. In the most recent outbreak of EVD in West Africa, the disease was first reported in southern Guinea forests; this was followed by dissemination into other districts as well as the capital city, Conakry [31]. The disease was also spread to Liberia from individuals who had a recent history of travel to Guinea and two patients suspected of having EVD died in Guinea and were repatriated to Sierra Leone for burial [63]. During outbreaks, several factors increase the risk of further spread of the disease. Outbreaks usually occur in regions that are resource poor and consequently have severely constrained Selleck TSA HDAC health services, lack of personal protective equipment and medical health personnel who have knowledge of the disease, especially risk factors for infection [8,

30]. Ignorance in the communities affected also plays a large role in further transmission of the disease. In the recent West African outbreak, there were reports of communities in denial, some people believing the disease was caused by the devil, or was brought ABT 263 in by politicians and even foreign medical personnel, the result being that infected individuals and their families did not want to seek medical attention [30, 64, 65]. Though there have been no recorded outbreaks of filovirus infection caused by displacement of people from areas of war and civil strife, there is potential for transmission of diseases to new areas in such situations [56], as in the case of the increased risk of reemergence of lymphatic filariasis in Thailand from Burmese refugees [66,

67]. There are currently over 2.6 million internally displaced persons in the DRC and over 450,000 refugees in neighboring countries [68]. Inter-ethnic conflict in South Sudan has resulted in a large number of internally displaced persons as well as refugees. South Sudan also hosts refugees from other countries, including the DRC [69]. As discussed above, there is great potential for new outbreaks of FHF in previously Phloretin unaffected areas. Various human activities such as increased travel and trade, encroachment into forests and caves, civil strife, and war, as well as wildlife activities relating to the ecology of filoviruses, may all contribute to opportunities for the spread of filoviruses from their reservoir hosts. To counter or mitigate these potential threats, there is a need for both sentinel laboratories and regional referral laboratories to help in the monitoring and surveillance of FHF. Increased investment in health infrastructure and development of diagnostic tests that are affordable and can be used in areas with limited diagnostic capability are also required. For these to work successfully, policies to facilitate collaboration between health authorities from different countries need to be implemented.